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Introduction
There is an increasing amount of interest in recent years on the economics of absenteeism. This has been spurred mainly by a growing awareness that the economic and social costs (e.g. sickness benefits, health care, early retirement) of the phenomenon are considerable. Estimates of the direct cost of absenteeism for the UK economy, which exclude difficult to quantify effects such as the impact on work climate and production bottlenecks, have exhibited an upward trend in recent decades. For example, they have risen from £6 billion per year in the 1980s (Brown and Sessions 1996) to £11.6 billion in 1993 (Barham and Begum 2005) and £17 billion in 2009 (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 2009). In most advanced economies absenteeism is now believed to account for economic losses of approximately 2-3 percent of Gross Domestic Product, or a typical year"s growth (EUROFOUND 1997; Edwards and Greasley 2010) . At a policy level the UK and other governments have also become increasingly concerned with the escalating number of people claiming sickness and incapacity benefits, a phenomenon that has overwhelmed social security budgets. For instance, expenditure on sickness and incapacity benefits, standing at £16bn in 2002, was four-times greater than the respective amount devoted to unemployment insurance (Department for Work and Pensions 2002).
While economists have focused in the past on elements of the job contract that interact with the cost of absence, such as the basic wage and sick pay replacement rates (Barmby et al. 1991, Johansson and Palme 1996; Henrekson and Persson 2004) , an examination of the impact of performance-related pay (PRP) schemes on absence rates has been neglected. The continued prevalence of contingent pay 1 schemes in modern British organizations has been extensively noted (Millward et al. 1992; Pendleton et al. 2009 ). Though such schemes have traditionally taken the form of incentives tied to individual (objective or subjective) output (e.g. payment by results, merit pay), collective schemes based on wider measures of performance (e.g. group or workplace bonuses) and more aggregate "shared capitalist" 3 schemes (e.g. profit-related pay, share-ownership) have become increasingly common (Bryson and Freeman 2010) . However, due to data constraints many studies in the past have examined the impact of a catch-all measure of PRP on the absenteeism of specific firms or industries (Wilson and Peel 1991; Brown et al. 1999; Engellandt and Riphahn 2011) . This has confounded the effect of individual measures of PRP on absenteeism in most cases, and has prohibited the detection of the exact incentive power of dissimilar types of PRP schemes. This paper examines the effect of a wide and heterogeneous set of PRP measures on the absence rates of private sector British firms.
2 It uses data from two cross-sections (1998 and 2004) that offers a wide range of workplace characteristics with which we attempt to comprehensively capture firm heterogeneity. It also permits the matching of employer-employee information when necessary.
Given the sparse previous literature on the effects of variable pay schemes on absenteeism, which has typically relied on a narrowly defined population (e.g. a single firm or plants within a firm, Brown 1994; Barmby et al. 1995) there is a clear need for using large nationally-representative samples to examine the topic. Despite its shortcomings, the WERS with its questions pertaining to variable pay schemes, workplace absence and numerous firm characteristics provides a particularly rich source of information that allows us to examine the relationship between absenteeism and PRP. Further, the two cross sections and the WERS panel allow us to examine the absenteeism-PRP relationship at different points in time.
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We show that, ceteris paribus, firms that employ PRP wage schemes that are tied primarily to the assessment of individual merit and performance are characterized by significantly lower absence rates.
This negative relation becomes stronger in firms that offer PRP to a greater proportion of their nonmanagerial workforce, and as the share of workers" earnings that is subject to variable pay rises. A series of sensitivity tests confirm that the negative relation of PRP with absence is robust to selectivity and to the inclusion of administrative measures of earnings and working hours and the injury and illness rate of establishments. It is also found to be robust to organization fixed effects, which implies that the negative effect of individual PRP on absence persists even among highly similar establishments that are part of the same organization. Further, quintile regression results suggest that PRP has an asymmetric effect on absence. We find that PRP has a stronger effect at establishments that have an absence rate that exceeds a typical average level of absence. Finally, evidence of a causal chain of reaction is detected, indicating that firms that suffer from high absence rates in the past are more likely to subsequently adopt individual PRP schemes. The same firms are, in turn, observed to benefit from lower current levels of absenteeism.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the hypothesized relation between performance pay and absenteeism, an important indicator of firm performance. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical estimates of the absenteeism-PRP relationship, while Sections 5
and 6 engage in a number of important sensitivity and endogeneity tests that exploit the WERS-ASHE and 1998-2004 WERS Panel Surveys, respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
PRP and Absenteeism
Economists originally viewed the absence phenomenon as a manifestation of the labour supply decisions of employees (Allen 1981) . Therefore, greater attention was paid to how hours of work adjust to economic incentives such as wages and statutory sick pay (e.g. Barmby et al. 1991) . Several demographic characteristics of workers have also been identified as important predictors of absenteeism, such as being female or of young age (Vistnes 1997; Dione and Dostie 2007) . Other researchers have 5 examined whether there is a "disciplining" impact of unemployment on attendance behavior (Leigh 1985; Barmby et al. 1994; Arai and Thoursie 2005) . Recently, economists have turned their focus to the demand side of the market, and most notably to firm characteristics that are argued to affect the cost of absence. Typical examples include working time schedules (Brown and Sessions 1996) , unionization (Allen 1984) , "assembly line" technologies (Coles and Tremble 1996; Coles et al. 2007) , teamwork (Heywood and Jirjahn 2004; Heywood et al. 2008) , and firm size (Barmby and Stephan 2000) .
Despite the fact that Allen (1981) identified merit wage increases and attendance bonuses as two potential "weapons" that firms can use for raising the penalty of employee absence, an examination of the impact of different PRP schemes on absenteeism has been sparse in the literature. According to the standard principal-agent model, firms will attempt to combat moral hazard by conditioning their employees" remuneration to signals of their effort (e.g. the amount of man-hours in the workplace). In equilibrium, firms will be willing to offer incentive pay when its marginal cost is outweighed by the increase in expected revenue, the latter related to a reduced sick wage bill associated with less employee absence. Similarly, workers will be incentivized to improve their attendance behavior when the marginal gain from not being absent exceeds the marginal cost of effort. This will be determined by the difference between the utility of the overall wage (base salary and bonus pay), on the one hand, and the sum of reservation utility and sick pay, on the other.
Since bonus pay is typically not covered (or partly covered) by the sickness insurance arrangements of firms (Barmby et al. 1991) , the shadow price of absence is attenuated by the offer of incentive pay.
Furthermore, it has been illustrated that diligent or healthier employees will self-select into firms offering PRP (Lazear 1986 (Lazear , 2000 . Due to the greater effort and/or specific traits of those receiving incentive pay, a positive relationship between PRP earnings/productivity and employment has been documented (Seiler 1984; Booth and Frank 1999; Gielen et al. 2010) . The gap between contractual and actual hours should therefore be bridged as workers respond optimally to the higher opportunity cost of leisure entailed by PRP. In addition, PRP schemes constitute part of a bundle of managerial innovations, known as High Performance Workplace Practices (HPWPs) (Bloom and van Reenen 2010) . Since HPWPs are believed 6 to breed greater feelings of employee empowerment and job satisfaction (Bauer 2004) , absenteeism is also expected to be negatively related to PRP via this avenue.
Despite the above arguments, the provision of PRP is likely to result in greater absence for a number of reasons. PRP schemes may undermine valuable teamwork by fostering an individualistic organizational culture that is permeated by envy and free-riding (Holmström 1979; Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Moreover, high-powered PRP schemes are believed to heighten the power asymmetry between supervisors and the workforce (Kohn 1993) . Psychological concerns over a potential "crowding-out" of intrinsic motivation and morale have been raised, with assumed adverse effects on productivity and turnout at work (Frey 1993; Frey and Jegen 2001) . PRP has also been associated with adverse health outcomes, such as dissatisfaction with work-related stress (Pouliakas and Theodossiou 2009) , an increased incidence of workplace injuries (Freeman and Kleiner 2005; Bender et al. 2009) and "presenteeism" (Chatterji and Tilley 2002; Skatun 2003) . The latter refers to a greater likelihood of workers becoming chronically ill due to pressure to return back to work earlier than what is required for a healthy recovery. Furthermore, inadequacies in compensation design have been highlighted, such as time inconsistency problems when offering long-term incentives to temporary contract employees (Schnebller and Kopelman 1983) and perverse reactions to capped bonuses that are stretched over extended qualifying time periods. For instance, workers are found to "backload" their absence days towards periods in which they anticipate to have already met their targets (Frick et al. 2008) .
From the conflicting hypotheses outlined above it becomes evident that there is no theoretical consensus regarding the overall effect of PRP on absenteeism. This ambiguity is also mirrored in the empirical evidence, with some studies confirming the beneficial impact of financial rewards on absence rates (e.g. Heywood et al. (2008) , only private sector establishments are retained for the purpose of the empirical analysis. 5 In addition, firms that offer PRP solely to managerial employees are dropped from the analysis, since nonmanagerial workers and executives are likely to be faced with a completely different set of incentive compatibility constraints (Murphy 1999) . 6 In addition, some of the PRP questions in the WERS survey are asked only if non-managerial workers are eligible for the respective instruments.
The WERS Cross-Section Data
The 1998 and 2004 cross-sections are the fourth and fifth instalments of a Government funded series of surveys conducted at British workplaces. The previous surveys were conducted in 1980, 1984 and 1990 .
The sample of workplaces was randomly drawn from the Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR). This is maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and is considered to be the highest quality sampling frame of workplaces available in the United Kingdom. The sample is stratified by workplace size and industry and larger workplaces and some industries are overrepresented (Chaplin et al. 2005 ).
An establishment is defined as comprising the activities of a single employer at a single set of premises, 8 for instance, a single branch of a bank, a car factory, or a school. The survey comprises three main sections; the "Management Questionnaire" (MQ) (face-to-face interviews with the most senior manager with day-to-day responsibility for personnel matters), the "Worker Representative Questionnaire" and the "Employee Questionnaire". All three interview based questionnaires were conducted using Computer-
Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI).
We use data from the MQ as information on absence rates is only available in this part of the survey. 7 Nonetheless, the matched employer-employee element of the data is exploited for the purpose of robustness checks. . There were also a number of changes to the format of the various survey questions (Airey et al. 1999; Kersley et al. 2006) . 9 It is acknowledged that this definition of absenteeism does not clarify what constitutes "authorized" leave, and that the definition of "authorized" leave may differ across workplaces. Nonetheless, it is believed to be a reliable measure of absence, since managers who responded to the survey were posted an Employee Profile Questionnaire (EPQ) and were requested to have it ready prior to the interview. This interviewing strategy gave managers the opportunity to report the establishment absence rate on the basis of their official registers rather than solely by memory. Thus, it is expected that recall bias is minimized relative to other sources that have used employee reports on absenteeism. The latter have typically been fraught with measurement errors due to the tendency of employees to underreport absence or to count days not scheduled for work as part of their overall absenteeism (Barham and Leonard 2002 In addition, both distributions are skewed to the right, so the median is lower than the mean. For instance, in the 1998 (2004) sample the median is 3.43 (3.0).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Managers were also asked questions regarding the provision of different forms of variable pay schemes in their workplace. Table A1 in the Appendix provides detailed definitions for the contingent pay variables of interest in the survey. Importantly, the PRP options were specified differently between the 1998 and 2004 waves. Nevertheless, in order to retain consistency in the PRP categories, the following four groups of contingent pay have been constructed following Pendleton et al. (2009) 
The ASHE-WERS Data
The WERS MQ collects limited information on wages. Even when using the data provided by the Employee Questionnaire, details on hourly and weekly wages are only provided within banded categories.
Furthermore, no information is provided in the WERS cross-section data indicating the proportion of employees" pay that is linked to performance measures. In order to overcome these deficiencies, the merged ASHE-WERS dataset has been utilized. This is constructed by combining information on 14 The ASHE contains information on employees" working hours and earnings obtained by administrative employer records, thus providing accurate measures. It also permits identification of the component of employees" gross annual earnings that is tied to an overall measure of bonus or incentive payments (including profit sharing, productivity performance, bonuses, piecework and commission payments). Almost 20% (n = 1,137) of the individuals in the sample are recipients of some form of incentive pay, corresponding to a median of 6 percent (£1000) of their annual gross pay. When averaged across establishments, it is evident that about 42 percent of workplaces offer some form of contingent pay scheme (i.e. there is at least one employee within a firm whose remuneration contains elements of incentive pay). As seen in Table 1 (Panel B), the average proportion of incentive pay tied to earnings within those firms that have adopted performance-contingent pay schemes is approximately 4 percent.
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The 1998-2004 WERS Panel Survey Data
The 1998 Importantly, 47% of firms that did not employ any form of contingent pay in 1998 are observed to do so six years later. Millward et al. (1992) , using data from previous WERS surveys (1980, 1984 and 1990 ) and analyzing workplaces with 25 or more employees, find that the fraction of workers who received some kind of merit pay was 34% in 1990. 16 In particular, for firms that did not have any type of PRP in 1998 the Pearson correlation coefficient between the 1998 absence rate and IPBR schemes in 2004 is r = 0.30 (p = 0.01), while for MP schemes it is r = 0.35 ( p < 0.01). Table 2 provides some simple cross-tabulations of the raw data on absence and various types of incentive
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Effect of PRP on Absence Rates
Descriptive statistics of the PRP-absenteeism relationship
pay. An independent samples t-test confirms that only MP is associated with significantly lower absence rates in both waves, though IPBR, CPBR and other cash bonuses (OCB) are also conducive to higher workplace attendance rates in the 1998 sample. These results highlight the important discrepancies that arise with respect to the distinct impact of different PRP instruments on absenteeism.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Effect of incidence and coverage of PRP schemes on absence
In order to detect the ceteris paribus relation between financial incentives and the absence rate, a number of important determinants of absenteeism are taken into account. As identified in the relevant literature (e.g. Heywood et al. 2008) , these include variables describing the demographic composition of the workforce (e.g. proportion of employees by gender and age), firm identity (establishment size, region of operation) and the nature of production (e.g. industrial sector, shares of occupational groups). Firm characteristics that are related to the labour-leisure tradeoff are also taken into account, such as working time schedules (e.g. mean establishment hours of work, whether employees engage in shift work, entitlement to an annualized hours scheme), contractual flexibility (proportion of employees on fixed term and part-time contracts) and economic incentives (mean establishment earnings, unemployment rate by travel to work area). Furthermore, the context of industrial relations (trade union density, presence of joint consultative committees and quality circles) and occupational health and safety policies (provision of sick pay in excess of statutory requirements, health and safety committees) are included as controls.
Summary statistics of all explanatory variables of interest are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
We estimate the following equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) : Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest that a logistic model may be more suitable. However, as no significant differences are detected between the estimates of logistic and OLS models in the analysis, the discussion in the remainder of the paper presents the OLS coefficients for simplicity.
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Panel A of Table 3 presents estimates of the various PRP schemes on the absenteeism of private sector establishments in Britain for both years of data. 18 It is evident that variable pay schemes that reward individual merit on the basis of subjective appraisals have a significant negative effect on the mean absence rate in both waves. IPBR also has a significant inverse relation to absence in 1998.
Specifically, firms which utilize MP and IPBR have a one percentage point lower absence rate in the 1998 data compared to firms without such schemes, ceteris paribus. For a mean absence rate of 4.3 percent (sample absence mean in 1998), the true effect is equal to -23.3 percentage points [(-1.0/4.3)*100], which is a considerable effect. A significant negative effect on absenteeism of 0.8 percentage points is also found with respect to the provision of OCB by firms (i.e. an 18.6 percentage point decrease at the mean).
In contrast, there is no evidence of a significant link between absence, CPBR, PFRP and ESO.
17 A generalized linear model (GLM) was also estimated, which assumes that the logit transformation of Absence comes from the family of binomial distributions. This takes into account excess concentration of observations at the boundaries of the permissible interval of responses. The marginal effects and their associated standard errors obtained from the GLM were almost identical to the OLS results reported in Table A3 (GLM results upon request). 18 The regression coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are found to correspond in most cases with the predictions of prior literature. Due to space considerations they are not discussed in the main text but are available in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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Column 2 of Managers" responses have been grouped into four broad categories: "1-39%", "40-79%" and "80-100%", the omitted category being "None". The results of an estimated absence equation that includes variables describing the proportion of workers covered by PRP, instead of its incidence, are displayed in Table 3 (Panel B). The regression coefficients are indicative of the fact that firms with a more extensive coverage of PRP are more likely to experience lower absence rates.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
19 Managers had to choose between the following categories: 1 "All" (100%), 2 "Almost all" (80-99%), 3 "Most" (60-79%), 4 "Around half" (40-59%), 5 "Some" (20-39%), 6 "Just a few" (1-19%), 7 "None". 20 Following Pendleton et al. (2009) , the possibility that establishments utilize different configurations of PRP schemes has also been examined. We did this by regressing the number (counts) of simultaneous PRP schemes used by establishments (e.g. 0,1,…,5) on the absence rate. However, significant evidence in favor of multiple interaction effects is found only in the 1998 data (upon request).
Effect of proportion of PRP tied to earnings: ASHE-WERS data
As mentioned in sub-section 3.3, the ASHE-WERS dataset allows for identification of the portion of employees" annual gross earnings that comes from bonus or incentive payments (profit sharing, productivity performance, piecework and commission), although it is not possible to distinguish the latter into its respective components. On the basis of this data set, the proportion of employees" salaries that is linked to a general measure of incentive pay, henceforth referred to as "intensity of PRP", is Table A3 ) are controlled for in the regression, whilst the standard errors are adjusted for clustering of employees within the same workplace.
In this manner, Panel C of Table 3 indicates that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the intensity of PRP and absenteeism, ceteris paribus. 21 In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in the average intensity of PRP per establishment is found to be associated with a 14 percentage point decrease on mean absence. This result closely resembles those of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Pouliakas (2010) who have shown that a higher intensity of incentive pay is associated with greater job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation among employees. 21 An alternative yet more arbitrary specification has also been utilized, whereby the continuous PRP intensity variable has been separated into a number of indicator dummies (e.g. 0%, 1-4%, 4-10%, >10%), roughly corresponding to the frequency distribution of the variable. It is hence confirmed that firms that employ highpowered incentives are significantly more likely to benefit from a lower absence rate relative to those firms that do not employ PRP schemes.
Sensitivity Analysis
Controlling for organization fixed effects
In the WERS data a number of workplaces constitute units of the same organization. To the extent that there is random variation in the use of particular PRP schemes by individual local branches that form part of a larger enterprise, the influence of PRP on absenteeism can hence be explored within a more "controlled" setting. In particular, identification of the exact workplaces that fall under the umbrella of the same organization permits the examination of the within-organization influence of PRP schemes on absenteeism that purges a significant part of any unobserved heterogeneity affecting OLS estimates. In order to pursue this avenue further, the unique IDBR reference numbers of firms contained with the ONS"s Virtual Micro-data Laboratory (VML) have been consulted. Cases in which at least two establishments (workplaces) of the WERS sample are local units of the same enterprise (organization) have been identified and retained. This led to a subsample of 305 workplaces that constitute local units of 97 broad organizations, whereby each enterprise contains an average of 3.14 workplaces. After confirming that there is significant within-organization variation in the incidence of incentive pay arrangements and in the absence rate 22 , the main absence equation (1) has been modified as follows:
where the subscript "o" now stands for "organization" and η o is the organization fixed effects term, capturing all of the factors that are constant across different workplaces that belong to the same organization. A fixed effects estimator has therefore been used to estimate equation (2) using the subsample of the 2004 WERS data described above. The main specification (eq. 1) has been retained, albeit with the omission of industry fixed effects since all firms within the same organization belong to the same industry. Importantly, Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the negative influence of MP on 22 For example, the overall variation of MP schemes in the 2004 data is 0.475, the between-organization variation is 0.339 and the within-organization variation is 0.367. Similarly, the overall variability of the absence rate is 0.079, the between-organization variation is 0.047 and the variation between establishments of the same organization is 0.064. The figures for the remaining variable pay schemes are available upon request. absenteeism persists even after controlling for a number of organization-invariant characteristics (e.g. the managerial policies of the headquarters). This finding supports the robustness of the OLS estimates reported in section 4.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Controlling for earnings and hours of work
As predicted by the standard labour-leisure paradigm, reliable estimation of an absence equation hinges critically on correctly identifying variation in earnings and working hours. For this reason, significant attention has been paid to ensuring that the PRP coefficients are robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of earnings and hours in the absence equation. First, the estimation has been replicated by including as controls relevant variables from the WERS cross-sectional surveys, such as the share of employees within earnings bands and the average work-week or overtime hours per establishment.
Reassuringly, the significant estimates of the PRP variables reported in Table 3 (Panel A) hold (available upon request).
Furthermore, given that the ASHE dataset contains superior information on working hours and earnings that come from administrative sources, the main 2004 absence regression has been replicated on the merged ASHE-WERS subsample. A constructed measure of average gross hourly earnings per establishment has been included as an additional regressor. As can be seen from Table 3 (Column 1 of Panel C), workplaces that offer a higher level of pay per hour to their employees are found to have a significantly lower rate of absence in the order of 7.6 percentage points. Importantly, the statistically significant negative effect of MP on absenteeism persists even after the inclusion of this accurate hourly earnings measure.
Taking self-selection into account
As is well-known from the model of Lazear (1986) , the prospect of PRP is likely to give rise to a selection issue, whereby more able, diligent and perhaps healthier employees are attracted to such compensation mechanisms. Therefore, it is typically difficult to disentangle whether PRP affects particular outcomes, such as absenteeism, due to its incentive properties or because of self-selection of different types of workers. In order to test whether the negative effect of individual PRP schemes on absenteeism is robust to the selectivity process, a number of additional control variables have been utilized in the analysis. These are used as proxies of the relative churning and "quality" of the workforce within establishments. First, a new variable has been included in the specification that captures the extent to which the workforce has remained the "same" in an establishment during the previous year of the survey. This is constructed after taking into account the proportion of new entrants into the workplace, minus those that left for a specific reason (e.g. dismissed, voluntary resigned, redundant and retired).
Although this measure is likely to underestimate the full impact of the selection process, it is notable that the negative relationship of the individual PRP variables with absenteeism persists even after taking the variation in the composition of the workforce between establishments into account (see Column 2 of Table 4 ). Furthermore, an additional test has been undertaken by controlling for whether firms use performance/competency or personality/attitude tests during the recruitment process. As before, the MP and IPBR coefficients remain robust (results upon request).
Controlling for the incidence of workplace illnesses and injuries
According to Bender et al. (2009) , even though piece rates are associated with greater productivity and a positive wage premium, they entail a greater likelihood of workplace injury occurring after controlling for other workplace hazards. Another counterproductive influence of PRP includes the so-called "presenteeism" phenomenon. Such a process is likely to result in a greater chance of future absence spells (Böckerman and Laukkanen 2010). In order to take the above issues into account two additional regressors have been added to the specification, which capture the workplace injury and illness rate. Specifically, they measure the proportion of employees that have sustained certain types of injuries (e.g. bone fracture, amputation, loss of sight etc.) or illnesses/disabilities/other physical problems (e.g. skin or respiration problems, stress, musculoskeletal disorders) during working hours in the previous year of the 20 survey. Since the original dependent variable refers to the percentage of workdays lost through both employee sickness or absence, we believe that by controlling for the illness or injury rate one can draw inferences regarding the effect of PRP on the residual component of absence. This residual part of absenteeism should be independent of the state of health and safety of the workforce. Indeed, as shown in Column 3 of Table 4 , even after engaging in such an exercise the beneficial attendance effect of MP and IPBR remains unaltered.
Interaction with teamwork
While the effectiveness of compensation schemes that rely heavily on teamwork hinges critically on the "silent" constraining effect of peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear 1992) , the evidence of Frick et al. (2008) and Dale-Olsen (2009) suggests that teamwork may be combined with PRP to significantly raise absence rates. This is attributed to the fact that since team production units can cover for absent colleagues without undue disruption in output, workers who anticipate meeting their production targets are likely to free-ride by taking unauthorized absence. It is therefore of interest to examine closely the interrelationship between teamwork, the provision of performance pay and absenteeism. In fact, the positive interaction term (Column 4 of Table 4) suggests that the sensitivity of absence to PRP is muted in firms with interdependent production. 23 This finding is in line with Brenčič and Norris (2010) and suggests that firms that are dependent on the productive collaborations of workers should exercise caution when deciding whether to implement a PRP scheme as part of a worker attendance plan.
Controlling for job satisfaction
In order to examine whether the negative effect of individual PRP on absenteeism is confounded by the job satisfaction of employees, the mean job satisfaction with respect to the facets of pay, influence and 21 achievement has been computed for each workplace, after matching information obtained by the WERS Employee Questionnaire.
24 Table 4 (Column 5) illustrates that the significant effect of MP on absenteeism disappears in both waves once the job satisfaction variables are entered into the absence regressions as separate explanatory variables. Job satisfaction with pay, in particular, has a significant negative association with absenteeism. This suggests that the effect of MP on attendance conduct hinges critically on whether the appraisal process that is linked to wage-setting provokes feelings of satisfaction among employees with respect to their compensation.
Quintile regressions
While the OLS estimates of Table 3 show that individual-based PRP schemes are likely to have a negative effect on absenteeism at the mean of the sample, it is interesting to explore the heterogeneity in the coefficients further due to the skewed nature of absenteeism across establishments. On theoretical grounds one would expect that variable pay schemes will exert a dissimilar impact on absenteeism, depending on whether firms have much higher or lower absence rates relative to a mean level of absence.
Most firms should be able to tolerate a mean level of absenteeism without experiencing production difficulties. However, levels of absence that exceed this sustainable level may be detrimental to firm performance due to difficulties in carrying out regular productive activities. In contrast, levels that are below the sustainable rate may give rise to problems such as presenteeism, or undue pressure on workers seeking to strike a work-life compromise. Table 5 , therefore, contains estimates of quintile regressions that examine the relationship between PRP schemes and absenteeism at five segments of the absence distribution. It is evident that the above a priori hypothesis is confirmed, since one observes an asymmetric effect of PRP schemes on absenteeism.
In particular, it is found that the marginal impact of PRP on the absence rate is larger at the higher rungs 24 These are the only three job satisfaction facets that are the same in the two WERS waves.
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of the absence distribution relative to the lower quintiles. This finding is presumably indicative of the greater potential that contingent pay might have for lowering the absence rate of firms experiencing high levels of absenteeism as they return back to the sustainable rate over time. In contrast, the strength of the effect of PRP is likely to be muted in establishments that have absence rates that are close to some average level.
[INSERT 
Endogeneity of PRP and Absence
Despite the robustness of the negative MP and IPBR (only in 1998) coefficients in the absence regression, it is possible that endogeneity and reverse causation underlie the significant correlations of the variables.
An important criticism regarding the detection of the "causal" effect of PRP on firm performance is that cross-sectional estimates are likely to mask unobserved firm heterogeneity. This may include dynamic feedback effects of past absence rates and inherent differences in the trend of productivity, both of which are correlated with the introduction of PRP schemes by firms and with current absence rates. For instance, it is possible that lower present absence rates may be unrelated to the effect of PRP per se, and reflect, instead, a historically rising trend of productivity that is correlated with the adoption of costly variable pay policies in the first place (Prendergast 1999, p. 43) . Previously abnormal absence rates that are regressing to the mean may also coincide with the implementation of PRP schemes by specific firms.
In order to address the aforementioned concerns, extra controls capturing the managers" subjective evaluation of current labour productivity within the establishment have been considered (see Column 6 of Table 4 ). In addition, the 1998 dataset contains the managers" subjective evaluation of whether labour productivity in their establishment has gone up or down compared to five years ago. In all cases no evidence is found that would imply that the effect of PRP on absenteeism is somehow modified by the fact that firm productivity or its trend is likely to be correlated with both the adoption of PRP schemes and lower absence rates. Results from equation (3) are displayed in Table 6A , which includes the marginal effects of the absence and PRP variables of interest. 25 The results indicate that higher levels of past absence are only significantly related to the incidence of individual-based PRP (MP and IPBR) in 2004. 26 In Table 6B it is also shown that this positive effect persists even among those firms that did not have those particular PRP schemes six years earlier. Therefore, there is evidence confirming the existence of an important endogenous feedback mechanism between absenteeism and PRP, whereby high absence rates in the past induce the introduction of PRP schemes within establishments in future time periods. This highlights the 25 The estimates of the remaining control variables are available upon request. Appropriate panel weights are used in the estimation of equation (3). 26 We also ran an OLS (reverse) regression where we regressed absence in 1998 on PRP schemes in 1998 and 2004, and all the other controls used in equation 3. We found a positive and statistically significant relationship between absence in 1998 and merit pay in 2004, which confirms the results presented in Table 6A (results upon request).
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fact that not including lagged values of absence in the main empirical specification of equation (1) 
Conclusion
Using two cross-sections (1998 and 2004) of the WERS, the matched employer-employee ASHE-WERS dataset and the panel element of the 1998-2004 WERS, the effect of various types of incentive pay on the absence rates of private sector firms is examined. Incentives that are tied to individual performance or output, particularly those that are tightly linked to the subjective evaluation of individual merit, are found to be significantly related to lower absenteeism, ceteris paribus. This effect is stronger in firms that cover a greater proportion of their non-managerial workforce with contingent pay policies. A series of sensitivity tests confirm that the negative relation of PRP with absence is robust to selectivity and to the inclusion of administrative measures of earnings and working hours, organization fixed effects and the injury and illness rate of establishments. However, job satisfaction with pay appears to be an important factor that can mediate the positive impact of MP schemes on attendance. High-powered incentives that link a greater share of employee earnings to incentive pay are also found to exert a significant negative influence on absenteeism. Quintile regression results suggest that PRP has an asymmetric effect on absence. We find that PRP has a stronger effect at establishments that have an absence rate above a sustainable level. Moreover, evidence from the 1998-2004 WERS Panel survey indicates that an endogenous feedback mechanism is at work, whereby high past absenteeism is related to a greater future incidence of individual PRP in firms, which, in turn, is correlated with lower current rates of absence. 27 It is known by the formula for omitted variable bias that
, where  is the coefficient of lagged absenteeism in an absence equation such as equation (1), and b is the slope of a regression that relates the lagged absence rates with the current incidence of variable pay schemes (e.g. equation (3)). Therefore, the estimated negative effect of PRP on current absence, 1  , will be downward-biased when one omits to include lagged absenteeism in the specification, due to the fact that  and b are likely to be positive.
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The analysis of this paper draws attention to the fact that only certain types of PRP, particularly those that shift the opportunity cost of absence solely onto the workers" shoulders, are likely to be beneficial as an absence control tool. However, this conclusion does not imply that PRP is a reward instrument that should be universally utilized by all types of firms to prevent worker non-attendance. Whether PRP is a suitable compensation strategy ultimately depends on the production technology of establishments. For example, it is shown that firms that rely on interdependent production should be wary of using PRP to combat absenteeism, and that the potential of PRP is likely to be greater for firms encountering particularly serious absenteeism difficulties.
It is also important to point out that due to data limitations it was not possible to adequately control for endogeneity and for dynamic effects in the absence variable using a suitable instrumental variable (IV) or panel data estimators in the empirical analysis. Nonetheless, the findings reported on the basis of the WERS panel data highlight the need for future research which will decouple the causal chain of reaction between historical rates of absence, the introduction of PRP schemes by firms and their effect on current levels of absenteeism. Statistics (mean, s.d) Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Estimates are weighted in Panels A and B. In Panel C the weights adjust for the merged ASHE-WERS sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In Panel C the standard errors are also adjusted for clustering of multiple individuals within the same establishment. Levels of significance: **1%. *5%, +10%. Full controls for Panel A are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix, while Panels B and C use the same controls. "---" implies that the variable is not present. The dependent variable has been divided by 100 for expositional purposes. Therefore, the size of the coefficient for MP in 1998 implies that firms with that particular variable pay scheme are likely to have a 1.1% (0.011*100) lower absence rate relative to those that do not. All statistical results in Panel C remain Crown Copyright, and should be acknowledged either as such or as "Source: ONS". Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Each column controls for the same variables as reported in Table A3 in the Appendix, albeit with the addition of the extra variables as shown in the rows of the Table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: **1%. *5%, +10%. "---" implies that the variable is not present. All statistical results in Column 1 remain Crown Copyright, and should be acknowledged either as such or as "Source: ONS". The number of observations in Column 1 are fewer than in the other columns, as the sample is restricted to include only those cases where more than two establishments are part of the same organization. The number of observations in Column 1 are fewer than in the other columns (except column 1) as we merge in information from the employee questionnaire and there is not perfect match. Table A3 in the Appendix. Full estimates are available upon request. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. "---" implies that the variable is not present. For robustness, we also estimated the above regressions by bootstrapping the standard errors using 1,000 replications. The estimates from the bootstrap exercise were very close to the ones reported above and are available upon request. -union employees, occupational groups; log number of employees, joint consultative committee, quality circles, industry and region fixed effects. 1998 controls include: whether any recognized unions, total number of employees, average duration of the normal working week for full-time largest occupational group, no change activity/takeover etc. since 1998, state of financial performance since 1998, relations between managers and employees at this workplace since 1998. Regression results are applicable to non-managerial employees and to those firms that did not have the respective variable pay scheme in 1998. Full estimates are available upon request. "---" implies that the variable is not present. 1998: Do any employees at this workplace receive payments or dividends from employee share ownership schemes? Eligibility refers to non-managerial employees.
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2004: Does the company operate any of the employee share schemes for any of the employees at this workplace (SIP, SAYE, EMI, CSOP, Other)? Eligibility refers to non-managerial employees.
Other cash bonus (OCB) 1998: Do any employees at this workplace receive payments or dividends from any of the following variable pay schemes: other cash bonus Notes: SIP=Share incentive plan, SAYE=Save as you earn, EMI= Enterprise management incentives, CSOP=Company share option plan, Other= Other employee share scheme Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: ** 1%, * 5%, + 10%. "---" implies that the variable is not present. Omitted categories: firms without variable pay scheme, percentage of routine or unskilled workers, zero proportions of employees work on fixed term contracts, employees are not entitled to sick pay in excess of statutory requirements, no specific health and safety committee, no joint consultative committee, no shift working arrangement for non-managerial employees, no annualized time arrangements for non-managerial employees.
